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Introduction 
 
In this article, I evaluate democracy, ministerial power and responsibility and 
institutional depoliticisation within the English NHS. A democratic deficit has existed 
within the NHS since its inception. The NHS’ administrative structure was designed to 
be accountable upwards to ministers (answerable to parliament) affording them a 
semblance of control over what was a professionally dominated service. Numerous 
reorganisations and management and market reforms, in the neo-liberal era (from the 
late 1970s onwards), sought to increase political control over the NHS. While 
successive governments claimed that they desired to empower patients (primarily 
through patient choice) and decentralise power, central control over the service has 
increased. Nonetheless, politicians sought to insulate themselves from responsibility 
through institutional depoliticisation, to shift blame, facilitated through legal changes. 
This strategy is evident in the creation of the National Institute for Clinical Excellence 
(NICE), Monitor and NHS England.  
 
While NICE and Monitor were created, by New Labour, in an effort to reduce 
government culpability for health technology regulation and the operation of 
foundation trusts (FTs), respectively, NHS England was established, by the Health 
and Social Care (HSC) Act (2012), in an effort to reduce government culpability for 
healthcare generally. NHS England was designed to enable governments to try to 
shift blame for NHS problems. This is significant as the English NHS is currently being 
undermined through inadequate funding (spending increases from 2010 onwards are 
the lowest in decades) and privatisation (many services are being outsourced to 
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private contractors paid from NHS budgets). While NHS England can potentially 
both politicise issues and remove them from political contestation, government 
strategies of blame shifting are unlikely to succeed as it retains important powers (such 
as determining NHS funding) and the public has not shifted from blaming the 
government to blaming NHS England. This demonstrates limits to the capacity of law 
to legitimise changes to social relations. Patient choice policies were justified on the 
basis of empowering patients but in fact enabled the creation of markets. I argue 
that addressing the NHS’ democratic deficit is crucial to empowering patients.  
 
Depoliticisation 
 
Colin Hay defines politics as ‘‘the capacity for agency and deliberation in situations of 
genuine collective or social choice’’. 1 If such capacity is undermined, this constitutes 
depoliticisation, which is a mode of reification. Once an issue is removed from agency 
and deliberation it becomes naturalised rather than contested. Neo-liberalism has 
been the dominant ideology in the UK since the disintegration of the post Second 
World War social democratic consensus in the 1970s. Successive governments have 
renewed the neo-liberal project 2 which David Harvey describes as a class project ‘‘to 
restore and consolidate capitalist class power’’. 3 Depoliticisation is a strategy of neo-
liberal governance. 4 The potential depoliticisation of neo-liberal reforms is significant 
because such reforms benefit the dominant class. For example, market reforms seek 
to redistribute wealth to the affluent 5 by facilitating the possibility of profit-making for 
private companies (which have influenced government policy) from services which are 
funded publicly. 6 Law may facilitate depoliticisation because, as Karl Klare argued, it 
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might induce ‘‘the belief that our evolving social arrangements and institutions are just 
and rational or at least inevitable and therefore legitimate’’. 7 Nonetheless, a tension 
exists between the capacity of law to legitimise changes to social relations and 
traditional views of what is legitimate. Bob Jessop contends that depoliticisation may 
occur on the levels of polity, politics and policy. 8 Governments have employed 
strategies on each level in their attempts to depoliticise healthcare.  
 
I concentrate on institutional depoliticization, 9 a polity level strategy involving a re-
organisation of the political division of labour in an effort to pass the buck. 8 The 
literature regarding depoliticisation has been criticised for overemphasising the novelty 
of the phenomenon. 10 I emphasise that the NHS has had a democratic deficit since 
1948 because politics is missing from its structure. 11 Democratic control was to be 
through ministerial accountability to parliament, which gave the Department of Health 
a semblance of control. Central control has increased, but ministers have utilised 
institutional depoliticisation in an attempt to reduce their accountability. Patrick 
Diamond argued, in relation to his research regarding New Labour, that there was a 
dialectical relationship between politicisation and depoliticisation as policymakers 
adopted a hybrid mix, accruing power to ‘take credit’ and giving it away (‘blame 
shifting’). 12 I assess whether the efforts of successive governments to shift blame 
regarding healthcare have been successful. This is increasingly significant as the NHS 
is currently being undermined by inadequate funding and privatisation. In respect of 
the former, recent spending increases from 2010 onwards are the lowest since the 
1950s, despite population growth of over four million and an increase in the elderly 
proportion of the population (with greater average costs). The NHS has not been 
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furnished with the spending increases above inflation of three to four percent per 
annum that it requires to maintain performance and grow services. 13 
 
Power and Responsibility 
 
Before the NHS, there were voluntary and municipal hospitals (administered by local 
authorities) within the UK. The National Health Service (NHS) Act (1946), passed by 
the first majority Labour government (1945-1951), created the UK NHS, which became 
operational in 1948. The statute nationalised hospitals, although many voluntary 
hospitals were disclaimed from its provisions. 14 The NHS’ founding principles were 
that it was to be free (at the point of access), universal, comprehensive and funded 
from general taxation. As public support for such principles endures, they can be 
viewed as part of what E.P. Thompson conceptualised as a moral economy, a 
‘‘popular consensus as to…legitimate and…illegitimate practices’’ based on a 
‘‘traditional view of social norms and obligations’’. 15 The NHS originally had a tripartite 
structure. Hospitals were administered by Regional Hospital Boards (RHBs), Hospital 
Management Committees (HMCs) and Boards of Governors (which administered 
teaching hospitals), Executive Councils administered GPs and dentists, and local 
authorities had responsibility for many personal and environmental health services. 16  
 
The NHS Act (1946) gave the Minister of Health both great power and great 
responsibility. William Mackenzie defined power as ‘‘the capability to affect people’’. 
17 The NHS Act (1946), S.1(1) required the Minister of Health to provide a 
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comprehensive health service. Mackenzie described the Minister of Health (now 
known as the Secretary of State for Health) as ‘‘without limit or qualification sovereign 
of the service’’. 17 The Minister appointed RHBs and historically, the NHS was 
regulated through circulars (often issued in line with the Minister’s power to give 
directions 18) and other Ministry of Health (now known as the Department of Health) 
policy statements. 19 The centre could not simply dictate as entrepreneurial, 
judgmental and professional knowledge, which was ‘‘too complex to be caught in 
crude statistics’’, lay with the periphery. 20 Such professional dominance led Peter 
Miller and Nikolas Rose to describe the NHS as a medical enclosure. 21 Thus, although 
sovereign in theory, the Minister of Health’s power was circumscribed in practice.  
 
Mackenzie defined responsibility as being answerable. 17 Democratic control over the 
service was to be through the Minister of Health’s accountability (the requirement to 
report and explain) 22 to parliament. The transfer of control over hospitals from 
democratically elected local authorities to unelected bodies was opposed, in cabinet, 
by Herbert Morrison (Deputy Prime Minister between 1945 and 1951). Ultimately, the 
plan of Aneurin Bevan (Minister of Health between 1945 and 1951) to nationalise such 
hospitals prevailed. Bevan feared that if local authorities were responsible for hospitals 
a second best service would have resulted. 23 Bevan hoped that future local 
government reform would enable the service to be democratised. 23 Accountability was 
designed to be through management upwards to the Minister of Health. 24  
 
Bevan famously stated that ‘‘if a bedpan lands on the floor in the hospital in Tredegar 
it should be clanging in Whitehall’’. 25 Brian Edwards notes that this quip haunted 
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Bevan’s successors, who complained that ‘‘the balance at the centre was not right’’. 26 
For example, David Owen (Minister of State for Health and Social Security between 
1974 and 1976) stated that the Department of Health had become ‘‘bogged down in 
detailed administration covering day-to-day management that has been sucked in by 
the parliamentary process’’. 27 In Owen’s view, the answerability of ministers to 
parliament gave the semblance of control, but in practice, there had been ‘‘little central 
direction or control’’ regarding some major aspects of healthcare. 27 The absence of 
politics within the NHS necessarily meant that the parliamentary process was the only 
way citizens could have their grievances, concerning healthcare, redressed. A Royal 
Commission determined that ‘‘detailed ministerial accountability for the NHS is largely 
a constitutional fiction’’. 28 This myth of ministerial accountability was deemed by an 
Association of Community Health Councils for England and Wales (ACHCEW) 
commission, chaired by Will Hutton, in 1999, to have ‘‘disguised a wider absence of 
accountability and transparency of decision making within NHS structures’’. 29  
 
Centralisation 
 
Successive reforms sought to increase central control. For example, in the early 
1970s, Keith Joseph (Secretary of State for Health and Social Services between 1970 
and 1974) devised an NHS reorganisation to unify its structure and strengthen 
accountability to the centre. 30 The National Health Service Reorganisation (NHSR) 
Act (1973) replaced RHBs and HMCs with Regional Health Authorities (RHAs), Area 
Health Authorities (AHAs) and District Management Teams (DMTs). The democratic 
deficit was unaddressed as the authorities were unelected. The NHSR Act (1973) also 
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required AHAs to appoint Family Practitioner Committees (FPCs), which replaced 
Executive Councils. FPCs were subsequently renamed Family Health Service 
Authorities (FHSAs). AHAs were abolished in 1982 and District Health Authorities 
(DHAs) replaced DMTs. In 1996 RHAs, DHAs and FHSAs were abolished and 100 
Health Authorities were established. 31 The NHSR Act (1973) also created Community 
Health Councils (CHCs) to represent patient voices. CHCs changed attitudes towards 
users, helped to politicise issues 32 and could halt contested service changes and refer 
them to the Secretary of State. However, Christine Hogg argued that they were ‘‘never 
intended as democratic control or accountability’’. 33 They were abolished (in England) 
in 2003 and replaced by a succession of weaker patient and public involvement 
mechanisms.  
 
The NHS had been dominated by professionals, but during Margaret Thatcher’s 
premiership (between 1979 and 1990), there was a shift ‘‘to a 
management/commercial logic’’. 34 In 1983, Roy Griffiths’ report recommended 
introducing general management. 35 Nicholas Timmins states that the NHS 
subsequently moved from an administered to a managed system. 36 General 
management was, according to John Mohan, ‘‘a means of imposing central 
government targets on the service’’. 37 Targets are based on indicators, which Sally 
Engle Merry describes as, ‘‘statistical measures that are used to consolidate complex 
data into a single number or rank that is meaningful to policymakers and the public’’. 
38 Such indicators evince a preference for superficial but standardized knowledge. 38 
The Griffiths report also led to the creation of a Supervisory Board (subsequently 
replaced by a Policy Board, which was abolished in 1995), to make strategic decisions, 
and a Management Board (subsequently renamed the NHS Management Executive 
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and then the NHS Executive and abolished in 2000), to plan policy implementation, 
within the Department of Health. The latter was moved to Leeds, but power and day-
to-day decision making remained with ministers in London. 39 Patricia Day and Rudolf 
Klein stated that the evolution of such bodies demonstrated the difficulty in separating 
policy from management. 40 
 
Simon Jenkins argues that general management did not relieve Thatcher’s 
government from political pressure. 41  Consequently, a review in the late 1980s led to 
the introduction of an internal market, which was implemented during John Major’s 
premiership (1990-1997). The internal market split purchasers and providers. The 
purchasers included DHAs and GPs (who could apply to become fundholders, 
thereby fragmenting the local power of DHAs and FHSAs). Providers were 
enabled to become NHS trusts with greater autonomy from DHAs. Both NHS 
trusts 42 and health authorities 43 were given private sector-style boards  which 
increased the democratic deficit, as even less attention was paid to notions of 
representativeness. 44 The reforms were regarded as replacing a management 
hierarchy with contracting between purchasers and providers. 45 However, hierarchical 
relationships remained largely intact 46 and central guidance strongly influenced 
purchasers. 44 Although market reforms are often justified on the basis of increasing 
efficiency, John Lister notes that they make healthcare ‘‘more bureaucratic and more 
expensive to administer’’. 47 For example, the internal market increased bureaucracy 
and overhead costs 48 by ending the advantages of cost-sharing and integrated care. 
49 The centralising effect of the reforms led Jenkins to argue that, by 1997, ‘‘Bevan’s 
desire to hear the clatter of every bedpan in the corridors of Westminster had been 
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realized’’ as the NHS became ‘‘micro-managed from the centre to meet the needs of 
short-term, media-led politics’’. 50  
 
New Labour 
 
The Labour party was rebranded as New Labour under Tony Blair’s leadership (1994-
2007) and won three successive general elections (in 1997, 2001 and 2005). Labour 
devolved powers to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, hence the Secretary of 
State for Health is now only responsible for the English NHS. New Labour had pledged 
to abolish the internal market, but although it abolished GP fundholding, 51 it retained 
the purchaser/provider split, which was renamed commissioning. 52 Commissioning 
was given to 481 Primary Care Groups (PCGs), which were GP-led bodies. PCGs 
subsequently evolved into 303 PCTs 53 (reduced to 152 in 2006). Health Authorities 
were consolidated into twenty-eight Strategic Health Authorities (SHAs). 54 SHAs 
were public bodies which published board papers and met in public until forced 
mergers reduced their number to ten in 2006. PCTs were not directly accountable 
to the public and were principally held to account through top-down management 
from SHAs. 22 Labour’s governance was described as ‘‘targets and terror’’. 55 It 
introduced numerous targets, such as reducing waits for outpatient and inpatient 
appointments and ending long waits (over four hours) in accident and emergency 
(A&E). 56 The amount of autonomy afforded to providers was determined by their 
performance in relation to targets. 55 Anna Dixon and Arturo Alvarez-Rosete describe 
targets as the epitome of micro-management, direct ministerial interference in the 
day-to-day running of the NHS. 57 New Labour also created a market in secondary 
‘‘With great power comes great responsibility’’. 
 
10 
 
care, evident in supply-side reforms, such as the creation of FTs and 
independent sector treatment centres (privately run centres which undertook 
NHS elective and diagnostic procedures and were paid approximately eleven 
percent more than NHS providers), and demand-side reforms, such as 
furnishing patients a choice of any willing provider (AWP) for some services. Andy 
Burnham (Secretary of State for Health between 2009 and 2010) appeared to 
change the AWP policy, in 2009, by announcing that the NHS was the preferred 
provider, but subsequent procurement guidance clarified that procurement 
should not favour any particular provider. 58 Although both New Labour and the 
subsequent coalition stated that they wanted to decentralise power within the NHS, 
Scott Greer and Margitta Matzke state that their reforms centralised power among 
strong nationwide regulators accountable to ministers. 59  
 
New Labour’s reforms led to ‘‘numerous functions traditionally overseen by health 
ministers’’ being ‘‘undertaken at arm’s length from the Department of Health’’. 60 NICE 
was created (it was a special health authority, 61 but is now an executive non-
departmental body 62) in an effort to reduce ministerial culpability regarding health 
technology regulation. According to Matthew Wood, NICE succeeded in reducing 
ministerial culpability, as it was supported by a structure of formal institutional rules 
and informal norms which meant that ministers did not seek to intervene in its decision 
making processes 63 (despite pharmaceutical companies and right wing newspapers 
pressuring ministers to make new drugs available). The Commission for Healthcare 
Audit and Inspection (CHAI), also known as the Healthcare Commission, was created 
to inspect NHS providers. 64 It was subsequently dissolved, along with the Commission 
for Social Care and Inspection and the Mental Health Act Commission and they were 
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replaced with the Care Quality Commission (CQC). 65 Despite the creation of such 
bodies, healthcare quality remains a contested issue. 
 
Monitor was created as the independent regulator of FTs. 64 FTs were created 
despite parliamentary opposition from Labour backbenchers. FTs can borrow 
money, generate surpluses and form subsidiaries and joint ventures with 
private companies, which can accumulate profits. Unlike other hospitals, with a 
line of accountability to the Department of Health, FTs were to be accountable to 
Monitor, their members (who are not required to be representative of, or answerable 
to, the local population 66), elected governors (FTs have a dual governance structure 
consisting of a board of governors and a board of directors), PCTs and CHAI. 67 John 
Reid (Secretary of State for Health between 2003 and 2005) confirmed that FTs ‘‘are 
independent of the department, and directly accountable to their local populations and 
to parliament’’. 68 Richard Lewis noted that this meant, in theory, no minister would 
have to defend healthcare professionals and managers in parliament. 69 Monitor was 
somewhat successful in reducing ministerial culpability because, as William Moyes 
(Executive Chairman of Monitor between 2004 and 2010) et al noted, frequently cases 
of failure or potential failure of FTs ‘‘were managed without ministerial intervention or 
formal parliamentary interest’’. 70   
 
However, Moyes et al state that major policy failures often lead to top-down 
accountability returning. 70 For example, they argue that the Mid Staffordshire NHS FT 
(Mid Staffs) case shows that a Secretary of State may consider themselves 
accountable and intervene, irrespective of the legal position, where a failing body 
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threatens patient health or safety. 70 The Mid Staffs scandal arose due to the poor 
care and high mortality rates at the hospital, which in its efforts to secure FT status, 
cut staffing levels to reduce a deficit. A public inquiry, chaired by Sir Robert Francis 
Q.C., was established in June 2010 to investigate the hospital. Moyes had informed 
Alan Johnson (Secretary of State for Health between 2007 and 2009) that he was not 
responsible for handling the scandal. 71 In response, Johnson told Moyes to ‘‘piss off’’ 
as he was ‘‘dealing with this’’. 71 The law may therefore be used to consolidate 
changes to public services, such as diminishing ministerial responsibility, but, in 
practice, ministers may still intervene. As Timmins avers, legislation is trumped by the 
behaviour of the minister. 36 This indicates that law may not legitimise changes to 
norms concerning ministerial behaviour where the public and politicians consider that 
ministers could or should intervene. Many NHS Chief Executives have complained 
about increased regulation and information demands since the Mid Staffs scandal 
and that FT freedoms have dwindled as funding has contracted. 72 
 
Developments since 2010 
 
The 2010 general election resulted in a hung parliament, following which the 
Conservative and Liberal Democrat parties formed a coalition government. The 
coalition’s central policy of austerity, which it justified on the basis of reducing the UK’s 
national deficit, which rose following the Great Recession (2008-2009), involved public 
spending cuts and public service restructuring. 73 However, Mark Blyth notes that 
austerity policies have not succeeded historically in promoting growth or reducing 
debts. 74 The coalition lasted until the 2015 general election, in which the 
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Conservatives won a majority of twelve in the House of Commons and were thus able 
to govern alone. David Cameron (Prime Minister between 2010 and 2016) resigned 
following the UK electorate’s vote to leave the European Union (EU) in a referendum 
in June 2016, and was succeeded by Theresa May. The Conservatives lost their 
majority in the 2017 general election, but continued to govern with the support of 
Northern Ireland’s Democratic Unionist Party (DUP). The policy of austerity has 
persisted since 2015 and has detrimentally affected public services. Although the 
coalition stated that it wanted to move away from process targets, their use has 
continued since 2010. 75 In addition, more indicators concerning outcomes, such as 
friends and family test scores (which convert patient experiences into a 
percentage of patients who would recommend a service to their family and 
friends), are being produced, partly to inform patient choice. Such indicators reduce 
quality to quantity which, Theodor Adorno argued, is a process of abstraction that 
‘‘distances itself from the objects’’. 76 I contend that enhancing patient voice is a 
preferable means of empowering patients.  
 
The HSC Act (2012) facilitates the current secondary care market. The legislation was 
passed despite much opposition, which led to an unprecedented pause as it 
proceeded through the legislative stages in parliament. The HSC Act (2012) abolished 
SHAs and PCTs and created NHS England and Clinical Commissioning Groups 
(CCGs), neither of which are directly accountable to the public. NHS England 
commissions primary care and specialist services, while CCGs commission secondary 
care services. Since April 2015, CCGs have been able to apply for joint or delegated 
responsibility for some primary care commissioning. 77 Regulations 78 passed pursuant 
to the HSC Act (2012), require commissioners to put many services out to tender. 
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Contracts may be awarded to a single provider or services may be opened up to 
patient choice of any qualified provider (AQP). Monitor was empowered as the sector 
regulator. CCGs are regulated as market actors by NHS Improvement (created 
following the merger of Monitor and the NHS Trust Development Authority in 2016), 
through a performance management regime run by NHS England 79 and also respond 
to their co-located local authority. 80 Calum Paton estimates that the recurring annual 
costs of the current market are approximately £4 billion. 81 
 
In 2014, John Appleby calculated that, accounting for inflation, NHS spending had 
increased by an average of 0.7 percent per year for six years, the lowest increase 
since the 1950s. 82 Lister states that the coalition aimed ‘‘to scale down public 
providers, downgrade and discredit public services and strengthen the position of 
private companies such as Serco and Virgin’’. 83 The competition provisions of the 
HSC Act (2012) have increased the proportion of the NHS budget going to private 
providers (the total amount was recently calculated as £12.7 billion 84), while 
inadequate funding has also facilitated increasing private activity outside the NHS. 85 
Nonetheless, private companies profits have been affected by austerity, campaign 
groups (such as Keep Our NHS Public) have kept privatisation highly politicised 86 and 
NHS England emphasised integration (rather than competition) in ‘Five Year Forward 
View’. 87 The coalition, and subsequent Conservative governments (which have also 
inadequately funded the NHS), have sought to shift the blame for the consequences 
of such policies. The HSC Act (2012), S.1 amended the NHS Act (2006), S.1(1), hence 
the Secretary of State for Health is no longer required to provide (as the earlier statute 
originally stated), only to promote, a comprehensive health service. Allyson Pollock 
states that the reason for the change is that alternative funding (from private health 
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insurance, charges or co-payments) will become necessary. 88 The Secretary of State 
retains ministerial responsibility to parliament for health service provision in England. 
Nonetheless, as Grahame Morris (Labour MP for Easington) noted, many of their 
functions have been given to other bodies. 89 Pollock and Price note that ‘‘ministers 
cannot be responsible to parliament for the exercise of functions that are not theirs’’. 
90 Consequently, they argue that parliament will ‘‘not be able to hold the Secretary of 
State to account for failures in the provision of health services’’. 90  
 
NHS England 
 
Matthew Flinders and Wood note that NHS England was established ‘‘on the basis of 
explicit arguments concerning the need to depoliticise healthcare policy’’. 91 The notion 
of creating an independent board to run the NHS had been suggested and rejected 
prior to NHS England’s creation. For example, Gordon Brown (Prime Minister between 
2007 and 2010) considered it before succeeding Blair. 92 NHS England is one of 
several national NHS organisations along with NICE, Public Health England, the CQC 
and NHS Improvement. Greer et al state that the old Department of Health was spun 
off into new organisations, creating the ‘‘potential for incoherence, duplication and turf 
wars at the centre’’. 93 In September 2016, Baroness Walmsley (a Liberal Democrat 
peer), contended that it was still ‘‘unclear how the five national bodies [NICE, CQC, 
PHE, NHS England and NHS Improvement] interact with each other, and where the 
Secretary of State comes into the picture’’. 94 Greer et al state that despite staff 
reductions within the Department of Health, ministers maintained a grip on policy 
through levers, such as the power of patronage, the power to set budgets and the 
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ability to legislate to achieve ministerial priorities. 95 Stephen Peckham expressed 
uncertainty regarding whether NHS England responds to political pressure from the 
public, the Department of Health and Parliament. 80 Much of its activity flows through 
its local area teams, which are accountable only upwards. 13 The Public Administration 
Select Committee determined, in 2014, that the relationship between the Secretary of 
State and NHS England was ‘‘still evolving’’. 96  
 
NHS England is a non-departmental body, outside of the formal structure of the civil 
service. 93 The Secretary of State is required to publish a mandate setting out 
objectives for NHS England and to review its effectiveness. 62 Although the coalition 
stated that NHS England would be independent, it appears to have responded to 
government pressure. In response to the announcement that responsibility for safe 
staffing ratios would be transferred from NICE to NHS England, Sir Robert Francis 
stated that ‘‘NICE…has an advantage not enjoyed by NHS England of being 
independent’’. 97 In 2014, Simon Stevens was appointed as NHS England’s Chief 
Executive. Stevens worked as a healthcare manager after leaving university and 
became a policy adviser to New Labour between 1997 and 2004. 98 Subsequently, he 
was employed as a Senior Executive by United Health, one of the largest private 
insurers in the United States (US). He became President of its Global Health division 
in 2009. In 2010, Stevens authored an article supporting the coalition’s then planned 
NHS reforms. 99 His employment history meant that his appointment was questioned. 
100 Solomon Hughes noted that whilst Stevens was at United Health, he campaigned 
against the proposed public option of Obamacare 101 and was a founder member of 
the Alliance for Healthcare Competitiveness (AHC), which sought to force NHS 
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privatisation through via a proposed trade deal between the US and the EU, known as 
the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). 102   
 
The Guardian columnist, Polly Toynbee, argued that Stevens’ independence enabled 
him to ‘‘write a report demanding money from the Treasury’’, which ‘‘no one in the old 
Department of Health could do’’. 98 Paton contends that Stevens successfully 
persuaded the government, prior to the 2015 general election, that £8 billion was 
required, although he argued that his ‘‘overambitious statement on efficiency savings 
of £22 billion…let the government off the hook somewhat’’. 81 However, David Laws 
(a Liberal Democrat who served in the coalition cabinet) contends that Stevens 
originally requested an extra £15-16 billion extra but was told to reduce the amount 
requested ‘‘to a more deliverable sum’’. 103 This casts doubt on NHS England’s 
independence and Stevens’ persuasive capabilities. The articulation of the £8 billion 
figure served to remove the resources that the NHS required from political 
contestation, as it was widely accepted. However, recent controversy regarding NHS 
funding demonstrates that it has become recontested. The House of Commons Health 
Committee deemed the £8 billion figure to be misleading as total health spending will 
increase by £4.5 billion in real terms by 2021. 104 Once NHS-specific inflation (staff, 
technology, drugs) is factored in, the figure shrinks to £800 million. 105 Thus the 
NHS is not being furnished with the reduced figure that Stevens was pressured to 
request. 
 
After she succeeded Cameron, May informed Stevens that the NHS should focus on 
efficiencies and could learn from the cuts implemented by the Home Office and the 
Ministry of Defence whilst she (May was Home Secretary between 2010 and 2016) 
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and Philip Hammond (who was Secretary of State for Defence between 2011 and 
2014 and who May appointed Chancellor of the Exchequer in 2016) were at those 
respective departments. 106 Efforts to secure efficiencies in the NHS through 
reductions in tariff payments to NHS providers have left many hospitals with deficits 
as their costs are outstripping their incomes. 107 Stevens challenged May’s narrative, 
that the NHS had received the amount that it had asked for, at a Committee of Public 
Accounts (CPA) hearing in January 2017, describing it as ‘‘stretching it’’. 108 
Subsequently, May’s aides briefed against him. 109 The CPA criticised the key players 
running the NHS for ‘‘bickering in public’’. 110 In November 2017, Stevens warned that 
faith in democratic politics would be eroded if extra money for the NHS, which had 
been promised in the 2016 Brexit referendum by some current cabinet ministers, such 
as Boris Johnson (Foreign Secretary since 2016), is not delivered. 111 Stevens 
requested that the NHS be afforded an extra £4 billion for 2018/19, but Hammond 
rejected this 112 and allocated less than half of this amount in his Autumn budget. 
 
Edwards argued, in 2007, that the creation of a Chief Executive of an independent 
NHS board would establish ‘‘for the first time a role for a powerful non-political leader 
of the NHS’’. 113 Similarly, I contend that NHS England’s Chief Executive has the 
potential to be a prominent national figure able to speak on the NHS’ behalf. Past NHS 
Chief Executives, who were part of the Department of Health, only appeared on 
television during minor crises. 39 In contrast, Stevens has been interviewed twice on 
the BBC’s prominent Sunday morning current events programme, ‘The Andrew Marr 
Show’. Such authority to speak on the NHS’ behalf can be viewed as a double-edged-
sword, as it may facilitate the removal of issues from political contestation (as is 
evidenced by the wide acceptance of the £8 billion figure) but may also politicise issues 
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(evidenced by the aforementioned bickering). The resignation of the NHS Chief 
Executive could also damage a government. Toynbee argued, in January 2017, that 
the resignations of Stevens and Jim Mackey (Chief Executive of NHS Improvement), 
on the grounds that insufficient funding was threatening patient safety, could have 
been an act of self–sacrifice to rescue the health service. 114 Stevens’ decision to stay 
indicates that, despite the bickering, there is agreement between NHS England and 
the government regarding NHS reform.  
 
Timmins contends that Stevens attracted much of the heat in the current funding crisis 
and that blame shifting has succeeded to the extent that Jeremy Hunt (Secretary of 
State for Health from 2012 onwards) ‘‘is apparently not responsible for what is 
happening on his watch’’. 115 Timmins avers that Hunt was able to appear on the radio 
and declare elements of NHS performance unacceptable, despite his involvement in 
its running (such as demanding performance updates and grilling representatives from 
various national bodies), and ‘‘emerge apparently unscathed’’. 115 NHS England’s 
existence may enable politicians the opportunity to engage in blame shifting, but I 
disagree with Timmins regarding the success of this strategy.  Although legal changes 
enable Hunt to criticise the NHS, Toynbee and David Walker note that Hunt was told 
to muzzle such criticism, prior to the general election in 2015, after polling data 
indicated that it was rebounding on the government. 116 The Conservatives failure to 
retain their majority in the 2017 general election may be attributable to public 
dissatisfaction with austerity policies which have impacted public services. Insufficient 
NHS funding has led to many cuts being proposed by Sustainability and 
Transformation Plans (STPs) which have been composed throughout England, which 
has been divided into forty-four STP areas. STPs are viewed as a move away from 
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competition to place based planning. 117 STPs comprise a top-down and secretive re-
organisation which has developed outside of the current legal framework. STPs are 
unaccountable, as they are not public bodies and are not within the ambit of the NHS 
Constitution or the Freedom of Information Act (2000). Stevens states that 
accountable care organisations (ACOs) will be developed in between six and ten STP 
areas ‘‘effectively ending the purchaser/provider split’’. 118 Without legislative changes, 
ACOs may be challenged for evading competitive tendering processes. 119 ACOs may 
present private companies with more opportunities and may be inimical to equity, as 
similar managed care organisations in the US have sought to exclude unprofitable 
patients. 120 STPs have generated opposition from the public and local councillors. 121 
 
In March 2017, an estimated 250,000 people participated in the biggest NHS rally in 
history (organised by Health Campaigns Together), marching in London in protest 
against cuts (whether or not proposed by STPs) and privatisation. 122 Many of the 
demonstrator’s placards criticised Hunt, while Stevens’ name was notably absent. This 
may be because Hunt has been a controversial Secretary of State. For example, he 
was involved in an acrimonious dispute regarding new contracts for junior doctors 
(who resorted to strike action in 2016). Insufficient funding means that the NHS is 
anticipating a difficult winter. May has reportedly told Stevens that he will be 
responsible for the NHS’ winter performance. 123 Nonetheless, while the government 
may try to shift blame, the public do not appear to have shifted from blaming the 
government to blaming NHS England. The traditional view of norms and obligations in 
England is that the government is responsible for healthcare. The government’s efforts 
to shift blame are impeded by the fact that it retains important powers, such as 
determining NHS funding. Frank Dobson (Secretary of State for Health between 1997 
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and 1999) states that although, in law, the minister does not have direct responsibility 
‘‘nobody believes it really, and he [Hunt] is clearly interfering all the time’’. 124 
Consequently, as Jarman argues, ‘‘the new structure of the NHS does not change the 
fact that the public and media will continue to attribute the success or failure of health 
policy to the government’’. 125 This indicates that there are limits to the legitimising 
capacity of law. Consequently, government failure to adequately fund the NHS may 
become increasingly difficult politically. 126  
 
Addressing the Democratic Deficit 
 
Market reforms were justified on the basis of empowering patients through furnishing 
them with choices. However, as Alex Mold notes, ‘‘choice was an attractive way to 
package NHS reform: it was not always about giving the patient more to choose from’’. 
127 For example, the AQP policy (which was itself a compromise replacing AWP) has 
taken a backseat. 128 In any event, as mentioned above, such choices rely on 
superficial indicators. I argue that voice is a preferable means of empowering patients. 
Fredric Jameson noted that freedom of choice is exaggerated and ‘‘is scarcely the 
same thing as the freedom of human beings to control their own destinies and to play 
an active part in shaping their collective life’’. 129 The national political process is too 
remote to enable citizens to meaningfully control and shape health policy. The Cities 
and Local Government Devolution Act (2016) has facilitated the devolution of health 
service functions to some English regions (such as Greater Manchester, London and 
Liverpool). Some argue that devolution has been adopted as another means of shifting 
blame. 130 Lisa Nandy (Labour MP for Wigan) notes that, so far, devolution has not 
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involved the public controlling and shaping health policy in Greater Manchester. 131 
The public across England have also not been involved in shaping STPs. I agree with 
the aforementioned ACHCEW commission which recommended that the public be 
directly involved in running the NHS or in electing its decision makers. 29 Bevan stated 
that ‘‘the purpose of getting power is to be able to give it away’’. 23 Politicians should 
give power away not to shift blame, but to empower citizens. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The NHS Act (1946) made the Minister of Health sovereign in theory, but their power 
was curtailed in practice. Although democratic control over the NHS was to be through 
their accountability to parliament, this was deemed to be a myth. Management and 
market reforms centralised control within the NHS. Successive governments have 
employed the strategy of institutional depoliticisation in an effort to reduce their 
culpability for healthcare. New Labour’s creation of NICE and Monitor were somewhat 
successful in this regard. The coalition created NHS England to try to pass the buck 
for healthcare in general, which is significant as the NHS is currently being undermined 
by inadequate funding and privatisation. NHS England has the potential both to 
politicise issues and to remove them from political contestation. While NHS England’s 
existence enables governments to try to shift blame, this strategy is unlikely to be 
entirely successful as the government retains important powers over the NHS and the 
public still regard it as responsible. I argued that addressing the democratic deficit 
within the NHS is a preferable means of empowering patients than market reforms. 
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